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Abstract—Smart Grids are evolving as the next generation
power systems that involve changes in the traditional ways of
generation, transmission and distribution of power. Advanced
Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is one of the key components
in smart grids. An AMI comprises of systems and networks,
that collects and analyzes data received from smart meters. In
addition, AMI also provides intelligent management of various
power-related applications and services based on the data col-
lected from smart meters. Thus, AMI plays a significant role in
the smooth functioning of smart grids.
AMI is a privileged target for security attacks as it is made up
of systems that are highly vulnerable to such attacks. Providing
security to AMI is necessary as adversaries can cause potential
damage against infrastructures and privacy in smart grid. One
of the most effective and challenging topic’s identified, is the Key
Management System (KMS), for sustaining the security concerns
in AMI. Therefore, KMS seeks to be a promising research area
for future development of AMI. This survey work highlights
the key security issues of advanced metering infrastructures and
focuses on how key management techniques can be utilized for
safeguarding AMI. First of all, we explore the main features of
advanced metering infrastructures and identify the relationship
between smart grid and AMI. Then, we introduce the security
issues and challenges of AMI. We also provide a classification
of the existing works in literature that deal with secure key
management system in AMI. Finally, we identify possible future
research directions of KMS in AMI.
Index Terms—Advanced Metering Infrastructure, Key Man-
agement System, Smart Grid, Smart Meters.
I. INTRODUCTION
SMART Grids reorganized the traditional concept andoperation of electrical grids by using information tech-
nology [1], [2]. Also, maximum utilization of information
technology is done in smart grids for achieving system ef-
ficiency and reliability [3]. In addition to power generation
and transmission utilities, smart grids consist of appliances,
meters, sensing devices, information gateways that operate
in near real time [4]. The meters perform the task of col-
lecting the energy consumption of appliances, broadcasting
energy loss/restoration information and reporting the pricing
information to customers. The sensing devices are deployed
to monitor the system performance and detect any operation
malfunction. Upon detection of any failure, the sensing devices
transmit control messages to the control center. Due to the fact
that smart meters are located far from the utility, intermediate
devices are needed to route the smart meters data to the util-
ity. Gateways (sometimes called concentrators) collect smart
meter’s data and send it to the utility over Wide Area Network
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(WAN) connection. Control information is also propagated
through the gateways to the smart meters.
The architecture of smart grid necessitates the smart meters,
sensing devices, gateways and the control centers to exist in
the path between the customers and the power providers for
realizing the two-way communication [5], [6]. A number of
factors are involved in designing of a smart grid, but mainly,
coordination among three fields of communication, control and
optimization is highly essential. Ideally, a smart grid design
should address reliability, adaptability and prediction issues.
Also, the designing should address the challenges for load
handling and demand adjustment, incorporation of advanced
services, flexibility and sustainability, end to end control
capability, power and service quality, cost and asset optimiza-
tion, security, performance, self-healing and restoration. In
general, a smart grid communication system is composed of a
horizontal integration of one or more regional control centers,
where each center is responsible for supervising the operation
of multiple power plants and substations [5]. Figure 1 shows
the structure of a smart grid communication system that
does data collection and control of electricity delivery. The
smart grid consists of components such as, regional control
center, substation, smart metering system and power plants.
A regional control center typically supports metering system,
operation data management, power market operations, power
system operation and data acquisition control. Substations
consist of Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) [7], [8] circuit
breaker, human machine interfaces, communication devices
(switches, hubs, and routers), log servers, data concentrators,
and a protocol gateway. Intelligent electronic devices are
field devices, that include an array of instrument transducers,
tap changers, circuit re-closers, phase measuring units, and
protection relays [5].
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) [9], that also goes
by the name “smart metering” [10] is a critical component, that
necessitates the realization of the vision of “Smart Grid”. In
general, AMI consists of the smart meters [11], [12], concen-
trators and the Meter Data Management System (MDMS) [13].
The smart meters contains the meter board and the commu-
nication board connected through a serial port. The meter
board contains a set of tables storing various information
including keys and passwords used for secure communication
and privilege levels. It also performs power consumption mea-
surements. The communication board is responsible for com-
munications with the outside nodes such as collectors, other
smart meters, or home appliances, and for performing any
required computation. Using an interrupt based mechanism,
the communication board fetches data and other necessary
information such as keys from the meter board whenever
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Fig. 1. A Smart Grid Communication System.
it needs to send data to the utility. The MDMS is a key
component in AMI, that is basically a database responsible for
long term data storage and management of the huge amount
of usage data and events.
AMI also facilitates two-way communication [14] between
meter and distribution system operator. The two-way commu-
nication enables several services for the distribution system
operator that were difficult or impossible to implement without
smart metering. For example, power outage is detected faster
by system operator and without interaction with the customer.
Another service provided by smart metering is reporting the
quality of power delivery (voltage, frequency). Smart metering
also enables detailed monitoring of power flows within the
distribution system that was previously available only at the
substation level. Monitoring of power flows is important as
it enables energy suppliers to react quickly on variations in
consumption levels. The power flow monitoring information
is also useful for real time pricing, that is handled by one
technology in smart grid known as Demand Side Management
(DSM) [15]. If prices for energy are variable and react on
current power flow information, real time pricing comes into
the picture. This is one feature of demand side management,
where the energy supplier influences the consumption of
energy directly and immediately [16].
The use of wireless communication in AMI leads to security
issues in such systems. There are several security issues with
regard to AMI that needs attention, ranging from the consumer
level to the generation as well as the producer level. The
adversary can launch an attack by sending false signals to
meters that may lead to power outage in a particular area as
well as disturb the demand generation model. The adversary
can also make use of the study of the utilization pattern of the
consumers for devising new forms of attacks.
Similar to other existing systems, AMI too needs to adhere
with the requirements of the security primitives of confiden-
tiality, integrity, availability [17] and non-repudiation.
• Confidentially is preserved in AMI by ensuring that
the energy consumption pattern of consumers are not
revealed to unauthorized entities.
• Integrity is maintained in the system through detection
of illegal data alternation.
• Availability requires the accessibility of data by an au-
thorized user on demand. If the required data is not found
at the time of need, the system violates the availability
aspect of the security requirement of the system. Any
natural or intentional incidents (such as hacking) must not
hamper the system from operating correctly. For example,
if the hacker wants to jam the network, the system must
comply with the availability aspect.
• Accountability (non-repudiation) means an action that
cannot be denied, i.e., the entities used in receiving or
transmitting data must not deny it. In the AMI network,
accountability ensures a timely response to the command
and control, and integrity of billing profile, etc.
To meet the security requirements stated above, crypto-
graphic countermeasures must be deployed. But cryptographic
mechanisms for AMI also require an efficient key manage-
ment [18], [19]. Inadequate key management may result in
possible key disclosure to attackers, and even endanger the
secure communications in AMI [20]. Therefore, key manage-
ment is a critical process and can be used as a defensive
mechanism against threats and vulnerabilities [21]. Generally,
the security requirements of AMI include confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and availability [22], [23]. Before AMI deployment,
the confidentiality for customer privacy and customer behavior,
as well as message authentication for meter reading, Demand
Response (DR) [24], and load control messages, are the most
important security requirements to be provided. Confidentiality
and integrity are ensured by encryption and authentication
protocols, that depend heavily on the security of cryptography
keys.
To ensure the security of cryptographic keys, the key man-
agement for large amounts of devices in AMI systems is very
important. Recently, several studies were conducted related to
the Key Management System (KMS) [25] of AMI, a vivid
description of the same is provided in Section III. Existing
surveys on smart grids discussed topics on architectures, ap-
plications, communication, smart metering and cyber security.
In contrast, this survey work deals with key management
systems for smart grid in AMI, a very critical area where very
less attention has been paid to. This survey showcases the
importance of AMI in smart grids and also focuses on the key
management system that plays a defensive role in AMI against
threats. The novelty of this survey is in the classification of
the existing works and outlining of future research in key
management system of AMI. The main contributions of this
survey are:
• We discuss the significance of AMI in smart grids as well
3and provide a classification for the current state-of-the-art
works in key management systems of AMI.
• We provide a comprehensive discussion on the system
structure of AMI, followed by the issues and challenges
faced by AMI.
• We classify the existing works in literature, based on their
commonality in approaches.
• We present a comparative study for the existing works in
key management system schemes in AMI, considering
communication, computation and storage overheads as
performance metrics. The metrics chosen for the compar-
ative analysis reflects the efficiency of the corresponding
scheme.
• We present promising directions for future research in
smart grids, particularly in the area of advanced metering
infrastructure where further research is required.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, description of AMI system features, followed by security
challenges and the role of key management system in AMI
are carried out. The classified approaches for existing key
management systems in AMI are discussed in Section III. In
Section IV, we present a comparative study for the current
state-of-the-art key management schemes proposed for smart
grid AMI. Finally, we identify the future directions and
provide conclusion in Sections V and VI, respectively.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides an insight into the Advanced Me-
tering Infrastructure including the system features (Section
II.A) together with the various security challenges (Section
II.B) involved in such a system. We discuss the role of key
management systems in AMI in Section II.C.
A. AMI System Features
1) Introduction: The Advanced Metering Infrastructure is
referred to as the system responsible for collecting, measuring
and analyzing energy usage from networks that are connected
to next generation electricity meters, or popularly known
as smart meters. An AMI comprises of software, hardware,
communication networks, customer associated systems and a
MDMS [26], [27], [28]. Similar to other systems, the smart
grid AMI also faces security threats from both inside and
outside the system. The utility services of AMI provided to
customers should ensure that the adapted security technologies
are not vulnerable to adversarial activities. Deploying AMI
in smart grid should guarantee confidentiality of user privacy
along with authentication for meter readings and control
messages.
A traditional AMI communication architecture shown in
Fig. 2, has a centralized MDMS surrounded by the main
operation and management services. The MDMS is composed
of analytical tools that enable the interaction with operation
and management systems including Outage Management Sys-
tem (OMS), Geographic Information System (GIS), Consumer
Information System (CIS) that manage the utility billing and
customer information, and Distribution Management System
(DMS) that provides power quality management and load
forecasting based on meter data.
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Fig. 2. AMI Communication Architecture.
2) AMI System Structure: An AMI is perceived as an
infrastructure that integrates several technologies for achieving
certain specific objectives. Figure 3 describes the components
of the AMI system structure that are briefly discussed below:
Smart Meters (SMs): Electrical meters that are responsible
for providing two-way communication [29], automated meter
data collection, outage management and also allow dynamic
pricing.
Distributed Energy Resources (DERs): Small scale renew-
able electricity generation systems that are used for family and
energy storage [30].
Gateways (GWs): Perform the task of implementing pro-
tocol conversion and communications between two hetero-
geneous networks, such as in-home network and wide area
network.
Wide Area Communication Infrastructure: Provides bidi-
rectional communication between costumers domain and the
utility system. Various architectures and medias are used like
power line communication system, cellular networks, or IP-
based networks [31].
Meter Data Management System (MDMS): Acts as database
system for storing, managing, and analyzing metering data for
proposing dynamic pricing, better customer service, demand
response and energy consumption management purposes [32].
Demand Response (DR) Program: is generally an agreement
between the utility and its customers where the customer is
ensured of reduced tariffs or discounts in the end-of-month
electricity bill, provided that he agrees to reduce his electricity
consumption in response to signals received by the grid.
The basic concept of the demand response program is that
if every customer conserves a little, there will be enough
power for everyone [15]. Currently there are different Demand
Response programs, each of which has its own policies in
terms of rewards, penalties, consumer notification policies
and consumer cooperation bases. The benefits of all these
demand programs are same irrespective of their particular
characteristics.
From communication perspective, the AMI comprises of the
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Fig. 3. AMI System Structure.
following networks:
Home Area Network (HAN): This type of network
connects smart meters and smart devices within home
premises [33], [34]. It also provides low cost monitoring and
control of the electric devices to reduce energy consumption.
Both low range wired and wireless technologies are used for
building such networks, though wireless technologies are more
dominant. These technologies include 2.4 GHz WiFi, 802.11
wireless networking protocol, ZigBee and HomePlug [35].
The smart meters are made up of many sensors and data
sources. Lightweight security mechanisms are needed for the
sensors used in the smart meters as they are generally resource
constrained [36].
Wide Area Network (WAN): This network performs the task
of connecting an AMI end in the local utility network and a
data concentrator [37], [38]. Data concentrator collects data
from a group of SMs over a network and sends this bulk
data to the headend. AMI headend manages the information
exchanges between external systems, such as MDMS and AMI
network.
Neighborhood Area Network (NAN): It is mainly the com-
bination of a number of HANs, where all types of neces-
sary information such as power consumption data, appliances
control and security alarms are transmitted to achieve energy
management [37].
Smart Meter Gateway (SMGW): It is the central communi-
cation component of smart grid infrastructure, that connects a
WAN with a network of devices of one or more smart meters.
SMGW maintains communication between the consumer with
his consuming and generating devices and are secure from
physical attacks [39]. SMGW has a security module that takes
care of basic authentication and aggregation of messages sent
by various meters on their way to the control center [40].
B. AMI Security Challenges
With the rapid growth in the development of smart grids
especially in the context of smart cities, have led to further
advancement in technologies such as AMI used in such
systems. Security challenges in AMI can in general result
from three different aspects: privacy preservation of end users,
system resilience against cyber attacks and power theft. In
this section, we discuss the context that gives these challenges
urgency as well as the technical challenges that need to be
addressed by smart grid communication infrastructures.
1) Privacy Preservation of End Users: With the increase in
the number of smart meters, security issues related with smart
grid and AMI continue to scale up considerably, both from
internal as well as external part of the system. The consumers’
life style can be exposed from the information obtained from
the consumers’ electric energy consumption, resulting in a
critical situation. Examples of leakage of critical information
can be in the form of, number of people living in the house,
duration of occupancy, type of appliances, security and alarm-
ing systems, special conditions such as medical emergencies
and so on. Many studies have shown how vital information is
obtainable by use of consumer profiling [41], [42]. Some work,
such as [43] introduced techniques for improving the privacy
protection of consumers data. The method used in [43] mainly
reshapes the overall pattern of data such that it is impossible to
differentiate between load patterns and signatures. This is done
by using three techniques of hiding, smoothing and mystifying
consumption using combination of grid and storage/battery as
power source.
For expansion of AMI, consumers satisfaction is very much
important. If consumers experience poor service or power
quality due to external system manipulation by unauthorized
parties or hackers, then, they may resist the implementation
of AMI. The price signal and commands obtained at the
consumer end are also probable areas for cyber and physical
attacks for the purpose of infrastructure damage or power theft.
Also, long distance transmission of data as well as storing the
data in different places for retransmission or analysis, makes
the data susceptible in terms of data theft or manipulation.
The government is closely working on these factors and on
procedures to guarantee customers privacy of information.
2) System resilience against Cyber Attacks: Cyber security
is a very important issue in smart grid due to rising chances
of cyber attacks and incidents against this critical sector
of the power grid. Cyber security must address deliberate
attacks, such as those from disgruntled employees, industrial
espionage, and terrorists, as well as inadvertent compromises
of the information infrastructure due to user errors, equipment
failures, and natural disasters [44]. From the vulnerability view
point, the attacker has the opportunity of entering into a smart
grid network, gain access to control software, and change load
conditions to destabilize the grid in unpredictable ways. A
smart meter is expected to retain its own digital credential and
thereby guaranteed to obtain secure connections with the smart
meter network. Even if a particular smart meter is attacked,
the adversary should be unable to leverage the compromised
meter to access information on other meters or penetrate into
the AMI of the smart grid.
To address the above cyber security threats, the general
requirements for AMI security can be summarized as follows:
• Confidentiality: Confidentiality as from the perspective
5of AMI can be perceived as privacy of consumer’s
consumption pattern and information, i.e., consumption
information must remain confidential. This means physi-
cal theft of meter to access the stored data, unauthorized
access to the data by other connected automated systems
through gateways, as well as customers access to other
customers information should be prevented [45]. At AMI
head end, customer information shall remain confidential
and only authorized systems will have access to certain
sets of data.
• Integrity: Integrity in AMI is applicable with respect
to the transmitted data from meter to the utility as well
as control commands from utility to the meter. Integrity
means preventing modifications in the data received from
meter, and in the commands sent to the meter [44]. The
objective of the hackers is to breach the integrity of the
system, by pretending that they are authorized entities
and generate commands for launching attacks. Compared
to electromechanical meters, smart meters are resilient
against physical or cyber attacks. Smart meters should
also be able to detect cyber attacks and ignore all issued
control commands to avoid breach in the integrity of the
system.
• Availability: Availability issues in AMI vary according
to the type of information communicated in the system.
Data that are not critical, can be collected in larger time
intervals, and the estimated values be used instead of the
actual ones. But, sometimes it is important that the actual
values are collected in minimum time. The main reason
for unavailability of data in AMI is component failure.
Component failure can result from physical damage,
software problem, or human tampering with the meter.
Communication failure can also be another source of
unavailability in AMI. There are several reasons for
communication failure such as interference, cut cables,
path degeneration, loss of bandwidth, network traffic, etc.
• Accountability: Means that the entities receiving the
data will not deny receiving it and vice versa, i.e., if
the entities did not receive the data, they cannot state
they have done so. In AMI, accountability is significantly
important from financial view point as well as responses
to control signals. Accountability requirement in partic-
ular is a concern, as different components of an AMI
system are generally manufactured by different vendors
and owned by different entities. Accurate time stamp of
information as well as time synchronization across AMI
network is also important in accountability. Audit logs
are the most common way to ensure accountability. For
accountability with respect to smart meters, all metered
values, changes to the parameters and tariffs should be
accountable since they are the basis for billing.
3) Power Theft Prevention: Electrical losses can occur at
any stage of generation, passing through step-up transformers,
transmission, distribution, and utilization. Generally, losses
during generation are technically easy to define, while losses in
transmission and distribution are difficult to quantify. Another
category of losses can be in the form of technical loss and non-
technical loss. Technical loss is considered natural because
of power dissipation in lines and components. On the other
hand, non-technical loss during transmission and distribution
of electricity is difficult to detect, calculate and prevent, thus,
resulting in a major problem for utility. The electro-mechanical
meters used in traditional systems for metering purposes pro-
vide very less or no security and are easy to manipulate. Thefts
in electro-mechanical meters are identified using methods [46]
such as direct connection to distribution lines, grounding the
neutral wire, attaching a magnet to electromechanical meter
etc. Smart meters usage resulted in elimination or reduction
in the above mentioned issues of electro-mechanical meters.
Smart meters are capable of recording zero readings and
informing the utility companies through AMI.
There also exist complex techniques for power theft that do
not involve the meter directly. Current Transformer tampering
is one of them. Current transformers are responsible for
matching the grid current rating with the meter rating for
meters of large loads. The secondary side wires of current
transformers are generally insulated, but it is possible to
damage this insulation and tap these wires. Based on the
number of wires tampered, the meter is compelled to read less
or even zero current amounts. The other method is to exchange
the position of damaged wires, causing phase shift and altering
the meter reading. Some of the stealing techniques used in
electro-mechanical meters work in systems with smart meters
and AMI too. Data tampering can occur at three different
stages: during data collection, when data is stored in the meter
and when data transits across the network. Data tampering
during collection can happen with both conventional and smart
meters. Interfering with data at the other two stages can only
happen with smart meters. In comparison with conventional
systems, AMI makes tampering meters more difficult using
data loggers. The loggers are capable of recording power
outages to the meter or inversion of power flow. Attackers
planning to use inversion or disconnecting techniques need to
also erase the logged events stored in the meter. Therefore, its
removal falls into the second category of tampering with stored
data in the meter. If attackers access the stored data of smart
meter they will have complete control over the meter as the
time of use tariffs, received or executed commands, event logs,
consumption and time stamps and the firmware reside there.
Generally, in power theft, the firmware and whole stored data
in the meter is not the attackers interest, instead manipulating
stored total demand and auditing logs is sufficient for them.
In another scenario, the data is modified while it is being
transferred over the network. This comprises of injecting false
data into the system, or intercepting communications within
the infrastructure. This type of attack is possible at each node
of the infrastructure. Different techniques were developed and
introduced to estimate and locate power theft.
C. Role of Key Management Systems in AMI
As mentioned in Section I, AMI is a new emerging technol-
ogy for smart grid, and is defined as the system used to mea-
sure, collect, store, analyze, and use energy usage data [47].
It also facilitates in building a bridge between consumers
6and electric power utilities. For providing the widest possible
platform for delivering a wide range of applications in the
future, open network and information techniques introduced
to the smart grid increases the chances of cyber security
threats. Generally, the cyber security requirements of AMI
include confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Before AMI
can be deployed, the confidentiality for customer privacy and
customer behavior, as well as message authentication for meter
reading, DR and load control messages, are the major security
requirements that need to be provided. Confidentiality and
integrity are solved by encryption and authentication protocols,
that depend on the security of cryptographic keys. To ensure
the security, the key management for large amounts of devices
in AMI systems is very important. The key management sys-
tem always comprises of a key organizational framework, key
generating, refreshing, distribution, storage policies, etc [48].
1) Key Management in Different Transmission Modes:
Messages in AMI can be classified into three classes based on
their mode of transmission: unicast, broadcast and multicast.
• Unicast communication: used for messages that are
transmitted from one point to the other one, for example,
when a smart meter reports its power consumption statis-
tics and estimated future energy demand to the utility
system. Based on the different messages in AMI systems,
the unicast transmission mode consists of three types
of messages: meter data, joining or leaving of Demand
Response projects and remote load control. The messages
are bidirectional: from user level side to the management
side or vice-versa.
• Broadcast communication: is used when messages are
transmitted from one point to all the other points. A typi-
cal example of a broadcast notification message includes
the real-time electricity pricing information sent from
utility system to all smart meters. Two types of messages
are transmitted in broadcast mode, namely, publishing
of DR projects and electrical pricing information. From
the key management outlook, the session keys should
be refreshed before every broadcast session to provide
confidentiality and integrity of the messages. The key re-
freshing policy for broadcast communication necessitates
that the key should be refreshed periodically.
• Multicast communication: is used when messages are
transmitted from one point to a subset of the other points,
e.g., a remote load control message from utility system
to SMs that subscribes to the same DR project. For all
the types of AMI messages, electrical pricing information
and remote load control are transmitted using multicast
mode. As the users who subscribe to a DR project are
not fixed, the group members who receive the multicast
messages should be updated in a certain period (such as
one day and one week) depending on the actual situation
of electric power utilities. Therefore, the key management
for multicast communication is separated into two parts.
One is similar to the broadcast communication. The
session key of multicast communication also should be
generated before every new session. In another one,
considering that the users may join or quit a DR project,
the group key and additional values should be regenerated
and refreshed with the support of unicast communication.
III. KEY MANAGEMENT APPROACHES
According to [32], key management systems are an im-
portant part of AMI that facilitates secure key generation,
distribution and rekeying. Different approaches were adapted
for ensuing efficient key management. In the literature authors
reported works that deal with the issue of key management
system. All these works are conducted through different
approaches based on different secure key generation and
distribution mechanisms. In this survey we categorize the
existing works, mainly into four categories, namely, key graph
technique, encryption based technique, Physically Unclonable
Function (PUF) based technique and hybrid technique. In
Fig. 4, we provide a classification of the state-of-the-art works
in the area of KMS in AMI of smart grids, which we have
analyzed in the following sections.
A. Key Graph Technique
By far, key graph technique is the most commonly used key
management mechanism due to the ease of implementation
and efficient performance. The key graph technique can be
classified into two categories, namely, multi-group key graph
technique and tree key graph technique. The following sub-
sections provide description of the works under the above
mentioned classification.
1) Multi-Group Key Graph: This section illustrates the
state-of-the-art works that adapted multi-group key graph
technique for secure key management in AMI.
Authors in [49] proposed a key management scheme for
AMI based on an efficient and scalable multi-group key
graph technique for securing unicast, multicast, and broad-
cast communications. This work also safeguards the security
requirements of AMI. The scheme is based on a multi-group
key graph structure that supports the management of multiple
demand response projects concurrently for every customer.
Here, individual keys between the smart meters and MDMS
is established using a specific method of securely exchanging
cryptographic keys over a public channel. The individual keys
are refreshed periodically and used in two ways. The first
one secures unicast communication between MDMS and SMs,
while the second is used for generating the multi-group key
graph for secure multicast communications. The MDMS is
responsible for generating a group key that is also refreshed
periodically for the DR project. The group key is generated
and transmitted through secure channels for each SM and used
for securing broadcast messages.
The scalability issue is addressed using Logical Key Hierar-
chy (LKH), where a key tree is used for every DR project. In
LKH, each member keeps a copy of its leaf secret keys and
all other keys corresponding to the nodes in the path from
its leaf to the root. The authors demonstrate that using their
proposed LKH, scalability is ensured for large smart grids with
dynamic demand response projects. Also, to reduce storage
and communication costs in key management, a multi-group
key graph structure is proposed in this work. The proposed
key graph technique allows multiple DR projects to share a
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new set of keys. When a user joins or leaves a DR project, the
communication cost for rekeying operations does not increase
significantly compared to the cost induced by using separate
LKH tree inside each DR project. In this work the multi-group
key graph structure is modeled as a two level graph. In the
lower level, every LKH tree denotes a set of users with the
same first DR project subscription, where the leaf node of the
tree is a user’s individual key and the tree’s root is the DR
project’s group key. The graph in the upper level represents
combinations of root keys for users subscribing to multiple DR
projects at the same time. The multi-group key graph used in
this work has the following properties: (i) a user only belongs
to one LKH tree in the multi-group key graph corresponding
his/her first DR project subscription. The user also has a copy
of its leaf secret key and all keys corresponding to the nodes
in the path from its leaf to the root in this tree; (ii) a user
has all group keys of the other DR projects to which he/she is
subscribed; and (iii) if a user leaves his/her first DR project and
remains subscribed to one or more DR projects, he/she will
shift to a new LKH tree. Authors claim that all these features
ensure a user does not subscribe and pay for the same DR
project multiple times.
In [50], the authors proposed a scalable multi-group key
management for AMI for securing data communications in
AMI. It is a key management scheme that supports unicast,
multicast and broadcast communications based on an efficient
multi-group key graph technique. The multi-group key graph
structure supports the management of multiple DR projects
simultaneously for each customer. Also, authors demonstrate
that this new structure scales to large smart grids with dy-
namic DR projects membership while meeting smart meters
constraints in terms of memory and bandwidth capacities.
In this work, a particular method of securely exchang-
ing cryptographic keys over a public channel is used for
establishing individual keys between the MDMS and smart
meters. The individual keys are refreshed periodically and
utilized in two ways. The first one is used for securing unicast
communications between MDMS and the SMs, and the other
one is used for generating the multigroup key graph for secure
multicast communications. The MDMS must also generate a
group key that is refreshed periodically for the default DR
project. This group key is generated and transmitted through
secure channels for each SM, and used for securing messages
transmitted in broadcast mode.
To address the scalability issue, the key graph techniques
used in this work is One-Way Function Trees (OFT) that is
improvised over the LKH protocol. In OFT, the MDMS and
all users individually compute the group key. The keys of
interior nodes are recursively computed from the keys of their
children. For reducing storage and communication costs in key
management, a multi-group key graph structure is proposed in
this work. The key graph technique allows several DR projects
to share a new set of keys. The multi-group key graph structure
is modeled as having two levels, lower and upper levels. In
the lower level, each OFT represents a set of users with the
same first DR project subscription. The leaf node of the tree
represents a users individual key and trees root is the DR
projects group key. The graph in the upper level represents
combinations of root keys for users subscribing to multiple
DR projects at the same time. The proposed key management
scheme supports both backward secrecy and forward secrecy.
An analysis of security and performance, and comparison
results exhibit that the scheme induces low storage as well
as low communication overheads.
Authors in [51] proposed four key management schemes
that can simultaneously support security, scalability, efficiency
and versatility. The first scheme named as Versatile and
Scalable key management scheme for AMI (VerSAMI), en-
sures secure unicast, multicast and broadcast communications
for a large-scale AMI system. VerSAMI also supports the
management of multiple DR programs. This is done so that
many customers are able to subscribe to multiple DR programs
simultaneously and subscribe/unsubscribe to any DR program
at any time. The multi-group key graph technique used here
efficiently handles the rekeying operations, while meeting the
limitations of smart meters in terms of memory and band-
width capacities. An improved version of VerSAMI, called,
VerSAMI+ is also proposed by the authors, that provides
enhancement in communication overhead. The problems in
VerSAMI as well as VerSAMI+ that occured due to individual
rekeying, and also to reduce the number of rekeying oper-
ations, another variant of VerSAMI, called Batch-VerSAMI
8was proposed by the authors. In Batch-VerSAMI, membership
changes are handled in batches instead of handling individu-
ally. The authors additionally proposed a dynamic membership
model that simulates the AMI system behavior. To prove the
efficiency of the proposed schemes, security and performance
analyses, as well as simulations are performed with state-of-
the-art schemes.
2) Tree Key Graph: This section describes the schemes that
use the tree key graph as the structure for the key management
system in AMI.
In [48], authors design a key management system for
dealing with the security requirements in AMI. The authors
develop the key management framework of the AMI system
based on the key graph. Three different key management
processes are designed for supporting the hybrid transmission
modes that also include key management for unicast, broad-
cast, and multicast modes. For minimizing the storage and
computation constraints of SMs, simple cryptographic algo-
rithms are chosen for key generation and refreshing policies.
As the members in a particular DR project is not consistent,
specific key refreshing policies are designed. Mainly the key
management framework based on the key graph concentrates
on managing the keys of a large number of SMs. Finally, the
security and performance of the KMS are analyzed. According
to the results, the proposed scheme is a possible solution for
AMI systems. Though the functions of AMI are not fixed, but
a KMS is designed for the collection of possible functions.
In actual scenario, the users can choose part of the KMS for
particular applications. Also, the communications are not fixed
but the characteristics of messages transmitted in the commu-
nication channels is decided by the function requirements. The
authors design three types of key management processes for
unicast, broadcast, and multicast communications depending
on function requirements and message types. Specific key re-
generation and refreshing policies are designed in each process
considering time requirements of functions, computation, and
storage limitations of SMs.
In [52], the authors introduce Information Centric Network-
ing (ICN) in AMI systems and also proposed a key manage-
ment scheme for large number of smart meters for ensuring
confidentiality, integrity and authentication. The scheme is
designed with an objective to control network congestion,
support mobility and ensure security. Authors claim that ICN’s
self-contained data security can help AMI system simplify
security processing. The energy data in AMI system needs
to be kept secret as they can reflect the privacy of people,
such as, someone is at home or not and eating habits. The
ICN implementations ensure data integrity as well as authen-
ticity by signature and confidentiality by encryption at data
creation, that differs from the protection available in end-to-
end communication channels. It relies on the protection of data
itself. Here, secure message exchange for unicast, broadcast
and multicast is ensured.
The ICN-AMI system structure develops the KMS frame
structure by key graph similar to that of [53]. The user key
is used for the unicast mode, the group key is used for the
multicast mode and the root key is used for the broadcast
mode. The ICN’s self-contained digital signature provides
integrity and authenticity and the proposed KMS provides data
confidentiality by encrypting payload for the three different
transmission modes. For the unicast transmission mode, four
types of messages are used namely, remote load control, join
or leave DR projects, loss or restoration of power notification
and the meter reading data. There are three steps in ICN-KMS
for unicast transmission mode to ensure data confidentiality,
integrity, availability and authenticity. In the ICN process,
the self-contained data security provides integrity, authenticity,
and availability. Messages having electrical pricing informa-
tion and released DR projects use broadcast mode. Both these
two types of messages are sent from operation domain to
customer domain. In broadcast transmission mode, confiden-
tiality is provided by root session key and the ICN proves
the integrity, availability, and authentication by signature. The
multicast transmission mode includes two types of messages:
remote load control and electrical pricing information. The
messages are transmitted from operation domain to customer
domain. As the users participating in DR projects can change
at any time, anybody can choose to join or leave the project at
any time based on their personal preference. The security and
performance analysis validate the correctness of the authors
claims. The simulation results also demonstrate that ICN-AMI
system achieves better performance with respect to resisting
attacks, KMS design, congestion control and mobility support.
B. Authentication Based Technique
The key management system in AMI using encryption based
technique generally follows two level encryption and iden-
tity based cryptography mechanisms. The following sections
discusses works that used authentication based technique for
KMS in advanced metering infrastructure.
1) Two level encryption: This section describes the work
based on two level encryption for key management system in
AMI.
In [54], a key management scheme is proposed based on
two level encryption method. The encryption is based on two
partially trusted simple servers that implement this method
without increasing packet overhead. One server is responsible
for data encryption between the meter and control center and
the other server manages the random sequence of data trans-
mission. Authors further introduce one-class support vector
machine algorithm for node-to-node authentication utilizing
the location information and the data transmission history
(node identity, packet size and frequency of transmission).
This mechanism helps in securing data communication privacy
without increasing the complexity of the conventional key
management scheme. This work is an extension of one of
the earlier work’s of the authors. The extended work uses
Received Signal Strength (RSS) and One Class Support Vector
Machine (OCSVM) techniques for node to node authentica-
tion. RSS is used for localization of meters using the received
signal strength from neighbouring meters. OCSVM is used for
detecting new and outlier data/packet, using current and pre-
vious data transmission history. Further, OCSVM based node
authentication increases robustness in key management system
without increasing any overhead and is easy to implement in
9devices with limited memory and computational ability. The
introduction of two separate servers for key management and
random sequenced packet transmission enhances robustness in
security in untrustworthy communication medium and servers.
Both qualitative and quantitative analyses reveal the scheme’s
efficacy in providing improvements in the key management
schemes of AMI.
2) Identity based cryptography: This section illustrates the
work that use identity based cryptography as the basis for
KMS.
This paper [55] proposes an efficient scheme that mutually
authenticates a smart meter of a home area network and an
authentication server in smart grid. This work also proposes
a key management protocol based on the Enhanced Identity-
Based Cryptography (EIBC) [56] for secure smart grid com-
munications using the public key infrastructure. EIBC is a
modified version of the IBC (Identity-Based Cryptography)
scheme, where the enhanced version significantly reduces the
overhead of key renewals. The key management protocol
employs PKI for smart grid communications as specified by
NIST. Also, the network overhead caused by control packets
for key management is minimized. The efficiency results of the
key refreshment protocol demonstrates that the Security and
Authentication Server (SAS), periodically broadcasts a new
key generation to refresh the public/private key pairs of all
the nodes as well as any required multicast security keys. The
authors claim that their mechanisms are capable of preventing
several attacks such as brute force, replay, DoS etc. while
reducing the management overhead. The improved efficiency
for key management is realized by periodically refreshing all
public/private key pairs as well as any multicast keys in all the
nodes using only one newly generated function broadcast by
the key generator entity. Security and performance analyses
are presented that demonstrate the desirable attributes of the
presented scheme.
C. PUF Based Technique
In contrast to key graph and hybrid techniques mentioned
above, PUF based technique for secure key management in
AMI has not been exploited much in the literature. This
section mentions two such works in the area of PUF based
KMS in AMI. One of them is based on broadcast group key
management [57] while the other uses hash chain [58].
1) Broadcast Group Key Management: This section pro-
vides description for the work that utilizes the broadcast group
key management technique in PUF base KMS.
In [57], the authors provide an end to end security for AMI
networks. The model is based on using weak (PUFs) [59]
as a security primitive to provide strong hardware based
authentication for smart meters and collectors. During the
initialization phase, the utility generates three hash functions
and a pair of challenges. The challenges are used for triggering
PUF responses, whereas, the hash functions are used for
obtaining hash codes and computing smart meter symmetric
key. The proposed approach provides efficient solution to
manage keys and a robust authentication mechanism. The
solution is developed using PUF devices that are cheap to
manufacture and provide hardware based strong authentica-
tion mechanisms against spoofing attacks. The access level
passwords for smart meters are generated and regenerated by
use of the PUF devices’ hardware based one way function.
Strong defense against key leakage is provided by the PUF
based secret generation method as the key is not stored
in memory. For supporting multicast communications, this
work utilizes Broadcast Group Key Management (BGKM)
scheme [60], [61]. The BGKM scheme is a special type of
group key management scheme that allows a subset of nodes
to communicate efficiently. BGKM is not computationally
intensive as only symmetric key cryptography is used. Every
smart meter in the network is designated an unique secret that
allows the smart meter to derive the group key. The BGKM
scheme is efficient and scalable as it is capable of addressing
any subset of nodes with a single message.
2) Hash Chain: The work described in this section em-
ploys hash chain mechanism for PUF based KMS. Authors
in [58] devised mechanisms for authenticated key exchange
protocol and message broadcasting protocol utilizing the PUF
technology in communication parties. The PUF is embedded
in the head end system for key exchange protocol while in
message broadcasting protocol, it is embedded in the smart
meters. The PUFs are used for generating the commitments
and random numbers that are required for running the pro-
tocols. In the authenticated key exchange protocol, the head
end system and smart meter exchange a session key after
authenticating each other. The protocol consists of four phases
namely, initialization, registration, mutual authentication and
key exchange. We utilize hash chain idea and a modified
version of Schnorr protocol [62] for proposing an authenti-
cated broadcast messaging protocol for the AMI systems. In
the proposed protocol, the head end is authenticated by the
smart meters. Thereby, the smart meters are ensured that the
message received is broadcast by the head end. The message
broadcasting protocol consists of three phases, initialization,
registration and authentication. The security analysis of the
proposed authenticated key exchange protocol shows that it
provides all the requirements of a secure one. Also, we showed
that our authenticated message broadcasting protocol is secure
against corrupted Smart Meters.
D. Hybrid Technique
Hybrid techniques for KMS provide for both symmetric
and asymmetric encryption for securing AMI in smart grids.
Hybrid techniques are grouped under two categories, namely,
ID based encryption and advanced encryption standard. This
section provides description on potential works that deal with
KMS using the hybrid techniques.
1) ID based encryption: The work in the following sec-
tion describes how ID based encryption assist in hybrid key
management in AMI.
The work in [32] proposes a hybrid key management
scheme for AMI by combining symmetric cryptosystem and
public key cryptosystem. The scheme employs elliptic curve
cryptosystems for achieving efficient authentication and ses-
sion key generation. Also, the scheme makes use of a specially
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designed key hierarchy for efficient generation and updation
of group keys. The key management scheme is based on ID-
based encryption and also employs the key graph technique for
efficient multicast key management. The main benefit of using
ID-based encryption is that no public key certificate is required
and the public key is simply the identity of an entity. This work
is mainly involved with two security issues: end-to-end key
establishment and multicast key management. End-to-end key
establishment enables the management side, i.e., MDMS to
establish session keys with each smart meter securely, and the
resulting session keys are used in multicast key management
for scalable and efficient group key management for AMI.
Security analysis and performance evaluation for this scheme
reveal that it is secure and efficient for AMI in smart grid.
2) Advance encryption standard: The work in this section
employs advance encryption standard for key management
systems in AMI.
Authors in [4] proposed a hybrid encryption scheme as
shown in Fig. 5, that exploits symmetric and asymmetric
encryptions for securing smart metering network. The pro-
posed method employs elliptic curve cryptography, where a
precomputation stage is introduced to minimize the compu-
tation overhead of elliptic curve encryption by eliminating
the time required to perform the scalar-point multiplication.
In this work a hybrid encryption scheme is developed that
exploits the secret key encryption with the public key cryp-
tography. The proposed scheme provides a lightweight key
management scheme to reduce the overhead of key generation,
distribution and renewal to cope with AMI constraints. The
scheme uses Advance Encryption Standard (AES) for the
data encapsulation cryptosystem and Elliptic curve encryp-
tion for the key encapsulation cryptosystem. The proposed
hybrid encryption cryptosystem is composed of three units:
symmetric encryption module, asymmetric encryption module
and message integrity module. The symmetric encryption
module is used to encrypt AMI messages using AES-128 with
an arbitrary key produced by random generation unit. The
asymmetric encryption module is used to encrypt the arbitrary
key used by the symmetric encryption module. The symmetric
encryption module acts as data encapsulation system, while the
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Fig. 5. Hybrid Cryptosystem.
asymmetric module acts as key encapsulation system. Message
integrity module is used to generate the integrity code that
enables detection of any form of tampering with the secure
message.
The messages transmitted using this proposed protocol has
the packet format as follow: a payload field that stores the
information that needs to be sent to the destination. The synch
and clock tolerance fields are used to protect against reply
attack. The synch field consists of 128 bits that stores the
message timestamp corresponding to message creation time,
whereas clock tolerance (32 bits) indicates for how long (in
milliseconds) the message remains valid. When a message is
received, the synch field is compared with the current time. If
the difference between the current time and synch is greater
than the value of the clock tolerance, the message is considered
replayed and is ignored. The precomputation parameter is
used to improve the security of the proposed protocol by
frequently updating the precomputed values that are used to
derive the cryptographic keys. The input to key derivation
function is updated once a new precomputation parameter
is received by multiplying the received value by the private
key. The hybrid cryptosystems encrypt the arbitrary key and
appends it to the message. The encrypted key is stored in the
key field. The size of this field depends on the original key
size and the public key algorithm used to encrypt the key.
Message Integrity Code (MIC) is used to protect message
integrity and authenticity. A message that is tamped with
or originated from an unauthorized source is detected when
MIC field is checked. The results obtained demonstrate that
the scheme performs well in terms of computation overhead,
storage requirements and communication overhead. Also, the
scheme ensures message confidentiality, thereby, providing
defense against eavesdropping and traffic analysis attack.
IV. COMPARATIVE STUDY
The objective of this section is to provide a detailed analysis
of the works that carried out efficient key management system
of AMI in smart grids, in the perspective of both security
and performance analyses. In Table I, we summarize the
TABLE I
NOTATION TABLE
Notation Description
n Number of smart meters
Npr Number of DR projects
mj Number of jth DR project member
Nsub(ui) The number of DR projects to which subscribes user ui
|K| Size of the key in bits
X Nsub(ui)
Y Npr −Nsub(ui)
c log2(Npr)
hk Height of the new home DR project
CP Cost for bilinear pairing
CM Cost for the multipoint multiplication
Cε Cost for the encryption function ε
Cr Cost for generating one key
Cf Cost for evaluation of the one-way function
A CP + CM
B Cε + Cf
P (4n+ 5) + Cf
Q 4nCf
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TABLE II
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Schemes Key Generation Key Sharing Key Freshness Forward and Backward Security Confidentiality Authentication Integrity
MK-AMI [20] D 5 D D 5 5 5
eSKAMI [50] D 5 D D D 5 D
KMSSC [48] D D D D D D D
KMSSC-IC [52] D 5 5 D D D D
SEES [57] D 5 D D D D D
SKM [32] D 5 D D D D D
SAMI [49] D D D D D D D
TABLE III
COMPUTATION COST
Schemes
End to End Key
Establishment Initializing a Group Adding a Member Deleting a Member
MDMS SM MDMS SM MDMS SM MDMS SM
SAMI [49] n(A) A n(A) + nCr hCε h(B) + Cr h(B) h(B) + Cr h(B)
KMSCC [48] - - nCε Cε P + (n+ 2)Cε Q+ Cε P + (n+ 2)Cε Q+ Cε
SKM [32] n(A) A 2n(B) + nCr hCε h(Cε + 2Cf ) + Cr h(B) h(Cε + 2Cf ) + Cr h(B)
eSKAMI [50] n(A) A n(B) + nCr hCε h(B) + Cr h(B) h(B) + Cr h(B)
MK-AMI [20] n(A) CP + CM n(B) + nCr hCε h(B) + Cr h(B) h(B) + Cr h(B)
TABLE IV
COMMUNICATION COST
Schemes
Communication Overhead
Member Addition Member Deletion
Unicast Broadcast Unicast Broadcast
SAMI [49] hj |K|+c |K|+c (hj +Npr − 1)|K| (hj + 2X + Y + hk)|K|+c
KMSCC [48] 2n|K| 0 2n|K| 0
SKM [32] h|K| h|K|+h 0 h|K|+h
eSKAMI [50] 2hj |K|+c |K|+c (2hj +Npr − 1)|K| (2hj + 2X + Y + 2hk)|K|+c
MK-AMI [20] hj |K|+c |K|+c (hj +Npr − 1)|K| (hj + 2X + Y + hk)|K|+c
terminologies that are used throughout the remaining of this
paper.
Table II highlights the security analysis of the various
schemes. In this table, we provide an insight into how effi-
cient the schemes are in comparison to each other by taking
into consideration certain security parameters. The parameters
considered are key generation, key sharing, key freshness,
forward and backward security, confidentiality, authentication
and integrity. On the other hand, performance analysis of the
different schemes through computation cost, communication
cost and storage cost are illustrated using three tables.
In Table II, the processes of key generation, key sharing
and key refreshment reflect that low communication overhead
is induced, that is important for time critical scenarios in AMI.
Key refreshing depends on whether there are users joining or
quitting the DR project. If there is an user who wants to join or
quit the DR project, the group key should be refreshed at the
update time. The forward secrecy implies that previously used
secret keys and messages must be inaccessible by the new
users who participate in a DR project, while the backward
secrecy means that the future secret keys and messages must
be inaccessible by users who leave a DR project. Forward
secrecy (in the context of group key management) means that
evicted members cannot learn the new group key. Backward
secrecy (in the context of group key management) means that
newly added members cannot learn previous group keys. As
users participating in DR projects are not fixed and can join
or leave any DR project at any time, therefore, preserving
forward and backward secrecy should be guaranteed.
Table III and Table IV provide the comparative analysis
of computation and communication costs, respectively of the
various schemes. The computation cost of the key management
protocols are divided into four parts: end to end key estab-
lishment, initializing group, adding a member and deleting a
member for both MDMS and smart meter. Considering one
example from Table III, the computation cost of the scheme
SKM, for initializing a group, is higher than that of the scheme
KMSSC. The results of Table III also reflect that, adding
a member or evicting a member for the SKM scheme is
much more efficient in comparison to KMSSC scheme. The
cost for the end-to-end key establishment protocol for the
scheme KMSSC is unavailable, as it is not specified what key
establishment mechanism is used.
The benchmarks provided in Table IV, demonstrate the
communication overhead of the different schemes. The com-
parative study is done using unicast and broadcast communi-
cation for both member addition as well as member deletion.
Taking one example from Table IV, the results reveal that the
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scheme MK-AMI performs better than the scheme eSKAMI
in terms of communication cost.
Table V provides the storage cost for the different schemes.
The storage costs are calculated for both MDMS and smart
meters. While the storage cost for MDMS is the same for
all the schemes except KMSCC, the same is also true for
the storage overhead in smart meters, except the schemes,
KMSCC and SKM.
.
TABLE V
STORAGE COST
Schemes Storage OverheadMDMS SMi
SAMI [49] 2
∑Npr
j=1 (mj − 1) + 1 log2 (|A|) +Nsub(ui) + 1
KMSCC [48] n+Npr + 1 Nsub(ui) + 2
SKM [32] 2
∑Npr
j=1 (mj − 1) + 1
∑Nsub(ui)
j=1 (log2mj + 1) + 1
eSKAMI [50] 2
∑Npr
j=1 (mj − 1) + 1 log2 (|A|) +Nsub(ui) + 1
MK-AMI [20] 2
∑Npr
j=1 (mj − 1) + 1 log2 (|A|) +Nsub(ui) + 1
V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This section presents some areas related to smart grids in
particular with key management in AMI that can be focused
upon as future research ventures.
Scalable Architecture: A scalable and pervasive communi-
cation infrastructure is very much significant from the view-
point of both construction and operation of a smart grid. A
common feature of smart grid systems is that, a large amount
of sensors are deployed over a wide area for implementing
the complex monitoring and control functions. Therefore, one
prime challenge in smart grid is how to build a scalable AMI
communication architecture to handle the huge amount of
data generated by those sensors. A smart grid communication
infrastructure needs the scalability of accommodating more
and more devices and services into it as well as more end-user
interaction real-time monitoring of energy meters. It is evident
that schemes based on conventional cryptographic operations
are neither efficient nor scalable to the traffic density and
resource constraints in a smart grid system. Therefore, we
need scalable but secure and efficient schemes tailored specif-
ically for smart grid AMI communications. This will enable
secure and efficient processing of meter reading data collec-
tion and message distribution management. Very few works,
such as [27], investigated the scalability issue of distributed
architecture in AMI. Also, key graph techniques can be used
for addressing the scalability issue in AMI [20]. The proposed
works considering scalable distributed architecture have shown
promising outcomes with respect to key management of AMI.
Therefore, future work should emphasize in building robust
scalable distributed AMI communication architecture in smart
grids.
Content Centric Networking: Content Centric Networking
(CCN) is emerging as the fundamental paradigm for the future
Internet and research initiatives are being undertaken for uti-
lizing it further. The purpose of the CCN paradigm, is to shift
the focus of communication from where information resides
to what information is needed. By naming information at the
networking layer, CCN favors the deployment of in-network
caching and multicast mechanisms, thus, information will be
targeted towards the interested hosts rather than hosts with
specifically set destinations. The in-network caching of data in
CCN improves network quality of services, especially, delivery
latency. The Content Centric Networking (CCN) approach can
be applied on AMI as a prospective future research area.
Taking into consideration the caching advantage of CCN, it
is widely believed that CCN can effectively reduce the AMI
network bandwidth. So, CCN can play a major role in the
traffic control development for the AMI system. The role
of CCN in key management of AMI can be investigated to
analyze how much effective role it plays.
Defensive Mechanisms against Threats and Attacks: AMI
in smart grids are very much exposed to several threats and
other vulnerabilities. AMI is an appropriate example of cyber
physical systems comprising of different types of hardware,
communication devices and MDMS. Therefore, AMI is very
much exposed to cyber physical attacks. Smart meter networks
and MDMS software must have sufficient security to pre-
vent any unauthorized modification in software configurations,
reading of recorded data, change in calibration, etc. Security
in AMI depends on authentication mechanism, communication
technologies and routing protocols. Another prevalent attack
of AMI in smart grids is Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
These attacks are related with temporary or permanent con-
nect/disconnect AMI messages and communication link(wire-
line or wireless) flooding/jamming by spoofing packets. In
DoS attacks, an adversary may forge the demand request of
a smart meter and keeps requesting a large amount of energy.
Data integrity attacks also affect the normal operation of AMI
by altering data timings, data analysis, false-data injection,
data replay and data modifications. Thus, attacks that are very
much prevalent in AMI need further exploration, specially with
respect to key management and prospective solutions provided
for defending such attacks.
Consumer privacy and security: Consumer privacy protec-
tion is a major requirement for present smart grid infrastruc-
ture. For this, smart meters should be equipped with latest
storage components having high security precisions. It should
not be accessed by unauthorized persons. Only authorized
personnels must be able to decrypt the encrypted meter data.
The privacy of customers and smart metering networks is
important to the eventual acceptance by the public. One way
to protect the consumers privacy is to make it impossible
for unauthorized parties to distinguish load patterns and sig-
natures [43]. Research in the area of providing consumer
privacy and security is going on and smart meter users need
to be reassured that their data is secure. Also, there is limited
research on AMI authentication and confidentiality of user data
privacy and behavior that needs serious attention.
Efficiency: From literature, it is quite evident that key man-
agement system is an essential component for secured AMI in
smart grids. As smart grid contains millions of devices, spread
across hundreds of organizations, the key management systems
used must be scalable to high levels. Further, key management
must offer strong security in terms of authentication and autho-
rization, inter-organizational interoperability and the highest
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possible levels of efficiency to ensure that unnecessary cost
due to overhead, provisioning and maintenance are minimized.
It is likely that new and highly efficient key management
systems (specialized to meet the requirements of smart grid)
are needed.
Role of AMI in Smart Cities: AMI could become one of
the defining aspects of the smart cities of the future. Its
widespread adoption could lead to a major impact in the
efficient functioning of smart cities. The impact could be,
unlimited savings and greater ease of use for consumers at
all income levels and suppliers of utilities, by harnessing real-
time data collection and consumer consumption patterns. If
smart cities of the future depend on wireless networks to
meet their utility demands, they can expect lower costs and
greater bandwidth. Wireless networks also have the capacity
to collect data from devices that are digitally-dormant today,
as the existing IoT has shown that virtually everything can
eventually be connected to the grid. Future works can be done
where the role of key management system of AMI in smart
cities are mainly focused upon.
Standardization: The establishment of industrial standards
for smart metering techniques is an important part for the
implementation of the future smart grid. Currently, extensive
activities are being performed in standardizing components
and communication between components of the advanced
metering infrastructure. As standardization is an integral part
for ensuring interworking of AMI equipment with hetero-
geneous manufactures, many regional and national institutes
strive hard to achieve this goal. Nowadays, more and more
Internet standards are applied in AMI. For example, the
International Electro technical Commission (IEC) has defined
application layer standards IEC 61968, that has created the
common information models for AMI [63]. The World Wide
Web Consortium (W3C) committees has designed XML and
EXI standards to address end-to-end messaging and formats.
Further, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE) 802.15.4 committee has addressed the gaps for cost-
effective wireless mesh Neighbor Area Networks (NANs) at
the physical and Media Access control (MAC) layers, etc.
Thus, the standardization factor needs much more attention
to make interoperability achievable for communication and
information of AMI in smart grids.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this survey paper, we focus on the studies that investigate
the challenges and opportunities of key management systems
in AMI. We provide a comprehensive survey of the key
management system of advanced metering infrastructure in
smart grid. We first give a brief introduction of the smart grid
and introduce the fundamental concepts of advanced metering
infrastructure that have emerged with the smart grid. Further,
we briefly describe how AMI is vulnerable to threats and
defensive solutions can be provided by using key management
systems. Next, we elaborate on the role of key management
system in AMI followed by the different communication
architectures that have adopted the key management systems
of AMI. Then, we surveyed the state-of-the-art-works that
developed mechanisms for efficient use of key management
system in AMI. Security analysis of the schemes dealing with
key management system in AMI is presented followed by
performance analysis of those schemes with respect to storage,
communication and computation overheads. Finally, potential
research directions for key management system of AMI in
smart grid security are identified. This key management system
analysis of AMI brings new and promising perspectives and
methodologies for future research in smart grid.
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